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This paper investigates how the formation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with 
the EU might affect the ability of the six Development Cooperation Ireland programme 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to continue to provide protection to their domestic agri-food 
sectors. Various scenarios are constructed on the assumption that ‘substantially all’ trade with 
the EU must be liberalised if the EPAs are to be compatible with WTO rules on regional 
trade agreements. The paper concludes that EPAs are unlikely to require major changes in 
existing levels of border protection provided to domestic agriculture in Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
Mozambique and Zambia but that the effects on Tanzania and Uganda could be greater. It 
argues that the preparation of a ‘defensive’ EPA strategy by these countries should occur in 
parallel with a strategic review of agricultural trade policy. 
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Introduction 
 
Despite the heavy (and justifiable) attention given to the Doha Round, most of the trade 
policy change that has occurred in Africa (and, arguably, in Europe too) has not happened 
primarily as a result of GATT/WTO negotiations. It has been the result of policy-based 
lending led by the international financial institutions (IFIs), bilateral/regional trade 
negotiations among African countries as well as autonomously determined change. The 
relative unimportance of the WTO Round as a source of change in national  trade policy is 
likely to be particularly marked in respect of agricultural market access for least developed 
countries (LDCs). This is because, under the provisions of the 1 August 2004 Ministerial 
Decision (WTO 2004), these states will not be required to liberalise their own policies in the 
event of a successful conclusion to the Doha Round. 
 
The impetus for any agricultural liberalisation for African LDCs over the next 10–15 years, 
therefore, is likely to lie outside the WTO. The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
currently being negotiated with the EU are the prime candidates as likely drivers of change. 
In 2000, the Cotonou Agreement committed signatories to replace by 2008 the trade regime 
that has governed exports from the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group to the EU for 
the last quarter of the 20th century. The new trade arrangements are currently being 
negotiated between the EU and regional groupings of ACP states. Negotiations on a 
successor regime began formally in 2002, but only in the past year have they begun to 
address the details of what might be in EPAs between the EU and six sub-ACP regions.
2  
 
All ACP states are currently preparing their positions on: 
 
♦  what they seek from the EU (their ‘offensive’ agenda); 
♦  how they should respond to EU requests (their ‘defensive’ position). 
One element of the defensive agenda is how to respond to EU demands for ‘reciprocity’. 
Under Lomé and Cotonou the ACP were required merely to treat the EU no less favourably 
than any other industrialised trade partner. In complete contrast, under the new EPAs the 
ACP will offer duty-free access for ‘substantially all’ their imports from the EU.  
 
This requirement for reciprocity is the critical element in the EU Commission’s mandate, 
even though this includes a range of other demands. It is critical in three senses and is the 
demand on which the defensive agenda must be researched as the first priority. The three 
facets of its centrality are: 
 
♦  it underpins the WTO justification for EPAs (which in turn must have a bearing 
on the EU’s own bottom line in the negotiations); 
                                                                  
2   West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. 
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♦  it has major implications for the production structure and government revenue of 
ACP states; and 
♦  the potential impact can be quantified and scenarios constructed on the basis of 
reasonably realistic assumptions. 
The position of the six programme countries for the Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI) 
development cooperation programme is ambivalent. They are currently negotiating in two of 
the EPA groups: 
 
♦  Ethiopia, Uganda and Zambia in the East and Southern Africa (ESA)group; and 
♦  Lesotho, Mozambique and Tanzania in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) group. 
But as beneficiaries of the EU’s ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) regime they will continue to 
have duty-free access to Europe regardless of the outcome of the EPA negotiations. Some 
have openly voiced the view that they might be better off sticking with EBA and forgetting 
about EPAs. On the other hand, EPAs will include features not found in EBA, including a 
contractual relationship with the EU and the potential of a coherent trade regime with the 
neighbouring countries that might foster regional integration. 
 
Even though they have the EBA option, therefore, the six focus countries need to assess what 
features they might seek in an EPA and which ones would be seriously problematic. Only 
then can they choose rationally whether the regime that is on offer at the end of the EPA 
negotiations is better or worse than EBA. 
 
This paper raises the question of how EPAs might affect agriculture in Africa. EPAs, it is 
said, will be ‘development’ rather than purely ‘trade’ agreements. The development 
components may have many implications for agriculture, but these cannot be discerned at 
present because so little is known about how the EU–ACP development relationship within 
EPAs will be different from the status quo. What is known about the difference between 
EPAs and current practice relates to trade policy. Within this realm the impact on agriculture 
will be determined by how much change results to the market conditions within which the 
sector operates.  
 
The paper describes the picture painted when some plausible assumptions are added to what 
is known about the probable trade dimensions of EPAs. And it comes to the conclusion that 
this may be an appropriate time to re-think agricultural strategies in the countries concerned 
whilst there is still time to alter the balance of policy – if this is considered a desirable thing 
to do. 
 
Assumptions of the analysis 
 
One of the distinctive features of EPAs is that the ACP countries will need to liberalise their 
trade policy towards the EU. Until the negotiations of the EPAs for Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia are nearing completion, it will not be possible 
to know exactly which products are to be included or excluded from liberalisation, or the 
timetable for liberalisation. But it is possible to build some plausible scenarios based upon 
reasonable assumptions.  
 
At the very least, these can alert observers and policy makers to potential agricultural 
development issues. This, in turn, may influence negotiating strategies both in terms of which  4
products to include/exclude from liberalisation and also, equally importantly, on the design of 
the ‘development dimension’ to be incorporated into each EPA. It may well be the case, for 
example, that liberalisation should be preceded by adjustment and support measures for the 
affected sectors in order to ensure that they are able to thrive in a post-liberalisation 
environment. 
 
An initial assumption is that the reciprocity measures in an EPA will primarily reflect the 
requirements of WTO Article XXIV. By offering preferences to the ACP under Cotonou the 
EU is necessarily discriminating against other countries that do not have equally favourable 
access to its market. Since non-discrimination between members is a fundamental tenet of the 
WTO, such behaviour can occur only if it is justified by being ‘hung’ on one of the ‘pegs’ 
that permits exceptions, or if the victims of discrimination choose to acquiesce. For most of 
last 30 years it has been the latter that has allowed the discrimination in favour of the ACP to 
occur, but since the mid-1990s the WTO environment has changed. Increasingly, countries 
that suffer the consequences of this discrimination have shown a willingness to challenge the 
EU’s preference agreements – and to win their cases in the WTO.  
 
Cotonou is currently justified within the WTO by a ‘waiver’ that expires at the end of 2007. 
Unless the waiver is renewed or the regime hung on an alternative ‘peg’ the EU’s trade 
preferences for the ACP could be subject to challenge from 2008. EPAs have been proposed 
as the answer to this problem. The WTO allows members that are creating an FTA or 
customs union (CU) to discriminate in favour of their partners and against outsiders provided 
that certain conditions are met. Those conditions relating to market access for goods are 
covered by Article XXIV.  
 
It is likely that EPAs will be considered FTAs. Even if some of the ACP sub-regions are 
functioning customs unions by 2007 (which is unlikely – see below), it is improbable that 
they would choose to apply the EU’s common external tariff. Hence, even if EPAs are 
agreements between two customs unions (the EU on the one hand and the ACP sub-region on 
the other) they will still probably be FTAs rather than forming a single customs union of all 
parties. 
 
In that case, the key requirement of Article XXIV is that ‘substantially all’ trade be 
liberalised within ‘a reasonable length of time’ (WTO 1995: p. 523–4). The term 
‘substantially all’ trade has never been defined, and even ‘a reasonable length of time’ is 
defined only in terms that it ‘should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases’ (ibid.: p.32, 
para. 3). 
 
Over a period of some years the EU has argued that the ‘substantially all’ requirement should 
be interpreted in what it calls quantitative terms. In other words, the condition of 
‘substantially all’ should be considered met if a certain proportion of the trade between the 
contracting parties is free of ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce’ (ibid.: 
p.524, para. 8(b)). An alternative view, advanced by some other WTO Members and dubbed 
the ‘qualitative approach’, would require all major sectors to be included in the liberalisation. 
Unless and until a clarification is provided, either as part of the WTO negotiations or as a 
consequence of a trade dispute, the issue will remain an open one. 
 
That being the case, the only reasonable working assumption at present is that EPAs will be 
required to satisfy a ‘quantitative’ definition of substantially all trade. In the context of the 
Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement with South Africa (TDCA), the EU 
expressed the view that the quantitative target could be met if 90 percent of the value of trade  5
between the parties in the base year were liberalised by the end of the implementation period. 
Moreover, the EU asserted that this 90 percent could be achieved asymmetrically, and it is 
said that the EU is liberalising on 94 percent of its imports from South Africa, with the latter 
liberalising on 86 percent of its imports, both measured with respect to base year trade flows. 
 
Armed with this precedent, it is possible to develop some plausible scenarios on the level of 
liberalisation that may be required of ACP states within an EPA. And the results can then be 
analysed to identify the extent to which there will necessarily be liberalisation of important 




This paper builds upon a broader exercise undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS) designed to encourage informed debates within each ACP country on the design of its 
EPA liberalisation scenarios. The project has involved creating a dataset for each ACP 
country with the information needed to calculate which products could be excluded, and 
which need to be included, in liberalisation on alternative definitions of the term 
‘substantially all’ trade.
3 The present paper takes the datasets for Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia and examines the potential implications for 
agriculture in these countries of alternative liberalisation scenarios. 
 
How much liberalisation? 
 
Four standard scenarios have been developed, covering all tariff lines for both agricultural 
and non-agricultural imports at the Harmonised System 6-digit (HS6) level. In the first two 
cases we seek to identify the ‘marginal tariff’. This is the highest applied tariff currently in 
force on any item that will be liberalised. Obviously, the competitive ‘shock’ caused by 
reciprocity will be much smaller in the case of a domestic economic activity currently 
protected by a tariff of 5 percent than by one of 100 percent. If the marginal tariff is high, 
liberalisation could expose some sectors to a sharp competitive shock; if it is low, this is 
unlikely to happen. 
 
Scenario 1 applies the spirit of the TDCA methodology but makes the assumption that the EU 
offers ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) treatment to all EPA members. It is widely expected that 
the EU will offer improved access to its market for ACP exports in this way. If it were to be 
the case, then the TDCA ‘average’ of 90 percent could be achieved by ACP states liberalising 
on just 80 percent of their imports from Europe (because the EU will be liberalising on 100 
percent). 
 
The second scenario follows a similar approach by starting with an initial assumption about 
the minimum share of ACP imports that must be liberalised. But it takes its cue from an 
informal presentation made by a DG Trade official at a workshop in the University of 
Stellenbosch in late 2004, in which he identified for each EPA region the proportion of trade 
that might have to be liberalised (Maerten 2004). These proportions are set out in Table 1. 
The reason why they vary between regions is that the extent of liberalisation varies according 
the relative importance of imports and exports. If the EU is assumed to liberalise on more 
than 90% then a region that has a trade surplus with Europe will need to liberalise on a   
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smaller share of its imports than one with a trade 
deficit in order to achieve the target 90% of total 
trade. Instead of assuming that every ACP state 
would need to liberalise on 80 percent of its imports 
from the EU, Scenario 2 applies these different 
thresholds to countries in the various regions. Of the 
six focus countries, this only makes a difference to 
the three that are negotiating in the Southern Africa 
group (Lesotho, Mozambique, and Tanzania) for 
which the relevant figure from Table 1 is 76 
percent.
4 For the other three, part of the East and 
Southern Africa group, Scenarios 1 and 2 are 
identical.  
 
The third and fourth scenarios take a different approach. Instead of applying a pre-set 
threshold to the proportion of trade that must be liberalised, the question has been reversed. 
In Scenario 3 we ask, instead, ‘if country X is to avoid liberalising on any product that 
currently faces an applied tariff in excess of 20 percent, what proportion of trade would need 
to be excluded from reciprocity?’ Scenario 4 is identical, save that the benchmark level of 
applied tariff is set at 10 percent. 
 
The objective of all four scenarios is to determine how great would be the potential reduction 
in import prices for agricultural products as a result of the liberalisation exercise. In the first 
two scenarios the aim is to identify the marginal tariff; all reciprocity reductions would be 
from this level or lower. In the second two scenarios the marginal tariff is pre-set (at 20 
percent or 10 percent). Here the point of the research is to form a view on whether the 
proportion of trade that would need to be excluded from liberalisation in order to achieve this 
marginal tariff is plausible. 
 
Who is negotiating? 
 
The EU has stated its preference for EPAs that are FTAs between two CUs – itself and its 
ACP partners. For this to happen, the ACP states must form a CU. Since most of them have 
this as an objective, this seems to be a desirable outcome. 
 
On the other hand, it is arguable that any such intra-ACP CU would need to fulfil the 
requirements of WTO Article XXIV, not the much less onerous requirements of the Enabling 
Clause under which the nascent African CUs are currently justified. This is because the EPAs 
would be inter-CU regimes and the African organisations might need to have their own legal 
persona. Only Article XXIV refers to CUs (in relation to goods trade). The Enabling Clause 
refers merely to "Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed 
contracting parties".
5   
 
It is inconceivable that all of the ACP states in any of the EPAs (with the possible exception 
of the Caribbean) will belong to such a CU that is fully functioning and implemented by end-
2007. Even in EPA groups where a CU is already scheduled to come into effect before this 
date there are outliers that are not involved or countries that have habitually failed to meet 
                                                                  
4  It is unclear whether Lesotho can in practice have a pattern and schedule of liberalisation that is different from that in the 
TDCA, but in case it can this paper assesses it on the same basis as the other five states. 
5   I am indebted to Dr Melaku Desta for this argument. 
Table 1. Assumptions of Scenario 2 
EPA sub-region  Proportion of 
trade to be 
liberalised (%)
West Africa  81 
Central Africa  79 
East and Southern Africa  80 
Southern Africa  76 
Caribbean 83 
Pacific 67 
Source: Maerten 2004.  7
previous deadlines. Still less likely is it that the CUs (again with the exception of the 
Caribbean) will have a supra-national authority authorised to sign trade agreements on its 
members’ behalf. 
 
It is highly likely, therefore, that any ACP CUs will still be in the process of completion 
when the EPAs have to be signed. This means that not all EPA states will share a common 
external tariff on all imports. Both for this reason and because of the absence of a supra-
national authority, many – if not all – ACP states will have to sign the EPA separately. And 
their tariff reduction schedules may well be different from those of their co-signatories. 
 
Which domestic production to protect?  
 
Each ACP state, therefore, must decide which products to exclude from and include in 
liberalisation. One criterion would be to use the exclusions solely to protect sensitive 
domestic production. Whether or not liberalisation towards the EU would result in pressure 
on domestic production is a question that cannot be answered with the data provided in this 
paper alone. Any increase in competition from imports would be transmitted through a fall in 
their price. Whilst the removal of a tariff might be expected to result in a price fall there are 
circumstances in which it would not do so. If the supply chain is uncompetitive, for example, 
suppliers may prefer to extract an economic rent on the current level of exports rather than 
increase sales. Such action could be more likely if the EU is not a globally competitive source 
of supply. On the other hand, if other trade partners seek equivalent treatment to that granted 
to the EU the competition effects of EPAs could be more substantial. 
 
Forecasting the competitive effects of reciprocity requires, therefore, considerable country-
specific market information; the analysis reported in this paper offers a ‘long-list’ of the 
products for which such data collection is the highest priority. If it is assumed, as a first 
approximation, that the current pattern of applied tariffs reflects government’s ranking of 
goods in terms of the need for protection, then the four scenarios can be oriented to exclude 
the items with the highest tariffs. Hence, Scenario 1 will exclude from liberalisation a basket 
of the products with the highest tariffs that accounts for 20 percent of the value of a country’s 
imports from the EU. Applied tariffs rather than bound tariffs are taken as the best indicator 
of sensitive products as they reveal the current preferences of the countries concerned; 
moreover, the EPA negotiations will be on the basis of change to applied tariffs. However, it 
would be possible to build the analysis on bound tariffs if these were felt to be more accurate 
indicators of the sensitivity of domestic production.  
 
The broad picture that arises from a strategy concentrating the exclusions on items with the 
highest applied tariffs is set out in Table 2, which shows the marginal tariff under Scenarios 1 
and 2 and the proportion of trade that would need to be excluded from liberalisation under 
Scenarios 3 and 4. On Scenario 1 only Ethiopia and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique have 
marginal tariffs that could be described as being significant in any sense. Lesotho’s 
‘liberalisation’ would be concentrated on products that are already duty free, while for 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia the marginal tariff would be 15 percent or less.  
 
Scenario 2 makes little difference. The marginal tariff falls only in the case of Mozambique – 
to 7.5 percent.  
 
Given these relatively low marginal tariffs, the relevance of Scenarios 3 and 4 is perhaps 
questionable. However, it is interesting to note that only a tiny increase in the proportion of 
trade excluded from liberalisation is required in order to make sure that none of the six  8
countries has a marginal tariff of over 20 percent. For Ethiopia, for example, it is necessary 
only to expand the exclusion category from 20 percent to 20.3 percent to ensure this result. In 
the case of Mozambique the increase needs only to be to 21.3 percent. 
 
An aim of limiting liberalisation just to products with a current tariff of 10 percent or less 
seems less feasible. For three of the countries (Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zambia) an 
implausibly high proportion of trade would need to be excluded from liberalisation in order to 
achieve the desired result. 
 
On the other hand, Scenario 4 may provide guidance to the implementation timetable for 
liberalisation. Not all items will be liberalised on entry into force of the EPA. In order to 
provide some protection from challenge in the WTO, it would be necessary to have a 
‘realistic’ liberalisation schedule. What is, or is not, ‘realistic’ would only be determined by 
scrutiny via the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (which is unlikely to form a 
view) or through dispute settlement. But the implication of Table 2 is that all six countries 
could probably limit their early liberalisation to products facing a current applied tariff of 10 
percent or less without driving a coach and horses through Article XXIV. In all cases, over 
half of trade could be liberalised early without pushing the marginal tariff above 10 percent, 
and for all countries except Zambia the proportion of trade that could be liberalised is around 
two-thirds. 
 
The broad picture painted by Table 2, therefore, is that countries which wish to use the 
leeway of Article XXIV primarily to protect from import competition domestic economic 
activities will have plenty of scope to do so. They can achieve their objectives either by 
excluding sectors from any liberalisation or by deferring until the end of the implementation 
period any significant change to trade policy. 
 
Table 2. The four scenarios applied to the focus countries
 
Country  Marginal tariff (%)
a  Percentage of trade not liberalised if: 
  Scenario 1 
b  Scenario 2 
c  Scenario 3 
d  Scenario 4 
e 
Ethiopia*
  30  30 20.3 38.3 
Lesotho*  0 0 3  9.8 
Mozambique  25  7.5 21.3 21.3 
Tanzania*  15  15 17.8 34.6 
Uganda  7 7 0  16.3 
Zambia*  15  15 13.2 44.7 
Note: 
(a)  The highest tariff currently levied on any liberalised item (if it is assumed that highest-tariff items will be excluded from 
liberalisation). For the countries marked with an asterisk, no account is taken of imports which face specific or complex 
duties, for which ad valorem equivalent tariffs have not been calculated, or those for which no tariff data are included in 
UNCTAD’s TRAINS database. 
(b)  80 percent of imports are liberalised (subject to note (a)). 
(c)  Liberalisation on shares of imports indicated in Table 1 (subject to note (a)). 
(d)  No liberalisation of any item with a current applied tariff in excess of 20 percent.  
(e)  No liberalisation of any item with a current tariff in excess of 10 percent. 
 
Taking account of revenue 
 
It is improbable that countries will simply exclude the items with the highest tariffs, and even 
if they did that would still leave open the extent to which such exclusions/deferrals will be 
concentrated on the agricultural sector. But before moving on to look at the implications in 
each country for agriculture, account must be taken of another basis for the ACP’s reciprocity 
strategy. This arises from their need to balance revenue needs against the desire to protect 
domestic activity. Often the two objectives are in conflict. To provide adequate protection 
tariffs must be high, but then they may reduce the value of imports to low levels so that little  9
tax revenue is raised. It may be the mid-level tariffs that raise the most revenue. And if 
exclusions are concentrated on the highest-tariff items, many of the medium-level ones will 
be liberalised. 
 
Table 3 provides a very rough guide to the extent of this danger. It is based on the ‘theoretical 
revenue’ that can be derived from each item – a figure obtained simply by applying the tariff 
rate to the value of imports from the EU. Hence, a 20 percent tariff will yield a theoretical 
revenue of €200,000 on €1 million in imports of the item. No account is taken, therefore, of 
any failure to collect revenue, either intended (e.g. because of a duty exemption or drawback 
arrangement) or unintended. 
 
Except for Lesotho, which is subject to the revenue-sharing formula of the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), all the states would lose a substantial share of their theoretical 
revenue on imports from the EU if exemptions were concentrated on items with the highest 
tariffs. On Scenario 1 four states would lose around half their revenue, and on Scenario 3 the 
proportions would be even higher. 
 
Given the imprecision of the revenue assessment (and the uncertainty over government 
revenue collection plans), it would be spurious to attempt any very precise balancing of 
protectionist and revenue-saving criteria. But, at the very least, it must be assumed that most 
countries will feel obliged to allocate part of the ‘exclusion basket’ to items that are important 
for revenue raising and the corollary that some items with higher-than-marginal applied 
tariffs will be liberalised in order to ‘make room’ in the basket. 
 
Table 3. Revenue share of liberalised items 
Country  Revenue share of liberalised items (%)
 a 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
Ethiopia
 b  49.7 49.7 49.1 24.8 
Lesotho
 b  0  0 66.5 20.4 
Mozambique  46.7 43.1 43.1 43.1 
Tanzania
 b  52.4 45.4 54.5 28.9 
Uganda  25.1 25.1  100 31.8 
Zambia
 b  56.8 56.8 66.0 17.2 
Note: 
(a)  Share in total ‘theoretical revenue’, i.e. tariff payable applied to value of imports, of items that would be liberalised (if it is 
assumed that highest-tariff items will be excluded from liberalisation). Note that the tariff applied is the maximum 
payable on any 8-/10-digit element within an HS6 subhead. 
(b)  The percentages shown take no account of imports facing specific or complex duties, for which ad valorem equivalent 
tariffs have not been calculated, or those for which no tariff data are included in UNCTAD’s TRAINS database. 
 
Applying the scenarios to agriculture 
 
Armed with these assumptions and caveats we can look in more detail at the potential 
agricultural exclusions (and, by implication, inclusions) for each of the six focus countries. 
This is done in Tables 4–9. 
 
The scenarios have been applied at the HS6 level, i.e. Scenario 1 has created a basket of the 
HS6 items with the highest tariffs that account for 20 percent of, say, Ethiopia’s imports from 
the EU. From within this basket, the products covered by the WTO’s Agreement on 
Agriculture have been identified and are reproduced in the tables which follow. The number 
of items in these baskets is quite large, so Tables 4–9 aggregate the data to the 4-digit (HS4) 
level. Since some subheads within each HS4 heading may be excluded whilst others are 
included, the tables give the number of HS6 subheads falling into each group. 
  10
A first step is for readers to take a view on the extent to which revenue concerns will result in 
some items in Tables 4–9 being removed from the exclusion basket. In the case of Ethiopia, 
for example, it seems very likely that this will push the marginal tariff to 40 percent. The 
revenue loss of concentrating the basket on the highest-tariff items would be almost 
50  percent. Only a few items in Table 4 would need to be removed before all of the 
remainder had applied tariffs of 40 percent. For the other countries there would be little effect 
on the marginal tariff since all (or almost all) the items listed face the same applied tariff.
6 
 
The issue then needs to be turned on its head, identifying from within the lists the products 
for which protection is considered most desirable/undesirable. The plausibility of maintaining 
an exclusion basket that includes all the most desirable and leaves out all the least desirable 
products can then be established. 
 
Both the desirability/undesirability test, and the combination of the resulting list with 
revenue-generating items, requires country-level case studies. But this paper can provide an 
initial guide to the potential candidates that require further analysis. We take first the case of 
Ethiopia and then consider whether or not the situation in the other countries is similar. 
 
Table 4 shows the agricultural items that would be excluded from liberalisation in Ethiopia 
under a Scenario 1 focused on the highest-tariff items. Few are obvious agricultural staples. 
High tariffs for eight of the bottom nine lines of the table are probably intended to raise 
revenue. The bulk of the rest are processed foods, and for these any competition would be 
with agro-industry rather than basic agriculture. It has been alleged that EU exports of these 
to Africa have increased disproportionately in recent years. This could be something to check 
further.  
 
Table 4. Ethiopia: composition of an exclusion basket based on Scenario 1 and applied tariff levels 
No. of HS6 
subheads 
HS4  Description  Max.  
tariff 
a 
Excluded  Not 
excluded 
0406  cheese and curd  30 2  3 
0603  cut flowers and flower buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or for ornamental purposes, 40  1  - 
0901  coffee, whether or not roasted or decaffeinated; coffee husks and skins; coffee  40  2  - 
0910  ginger, saffron, turmeric 'curcuma', thyme, bay leaves, curry and other spices (excl. 40 1  - 
1104 cereal  grains otherwise worked, e.g. hulled, rolled, flaked, pearled, sliced or kebbled;  30  1  - 
1302 vegetable saps and extracts; pectic substances, pectinates and pectates; agar-agar 30 2  1 
1507  soya-bean oil and its fractions, whether or not refined (excl. chemically modified)  40  1  1 
1508  groundnut oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified  40  1  - 
1509  olive oil and its fractions obtained from the fruit of the olive tree solely by mechanical or  40  2  - 
1510  other oils and their fractions, obtained solely from olives, whether or not refined, but  40  1  - 
1512 sunflower-seed, safflower or cotton-seed oil and fractions thereof, whether or not  40  1  - 
1515 fixed  vegetable fats and oils, incl. jojoba oil, and their fractions, whether or not refined,  40  2  1 
1516  animal or vegetable fats and oils and their fractions, partly or wholly hydrogenated, 40  1 - 
1517 margarine, other edible mixtures or preparations of animal or vegetable fats or oils and  40  2  - 
1601 sausages and similar products, of meat, offal or blood; food preparations based on  40  1  - 
1602  prepared or preserved meat, offal or blood (excl. sausages and similar products, and  40  8  - 
1704  sugar confectionery not containing cocoa, incl. white chocolate  40  1  - 
1805  cocoa powder, not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter  40  1  - 
1806  chocolate and other food preparations containing cocoa  40  5  - 
1901  malt extract; food preparations of flour, groats, meal, starch or malt extract, not  40  3  - 
1902  pasta, whether or not cooked or stuffed with meat or other substances or otherwise  40  5  - 
1904  prepared foods obtained by the swelling or roasting of cereals or cereal products, e.g. 40  1  - 
                                                                  
6   Except Lesotho, for which revenue is of little relevance  11
No. of HS6 
subheads 
HS4  Description  Max.  
tariff 
a 
Excluded  Not 
excluded 
1905 bread,  pastry, cakes, biscuits and other bakers' wares, whether or not containing 40  2  - 
2007  jams, fruit jellies, marmalades, fruit or nut puree and fruit or nut pastes, obtained by 30 1 1 
2103 sauce  and  preparations therefor; mixed condiments and mixed seasonings; mustard  30  1  3 
2106  food preparations, n.e.s.  30  1  1 
2201  waters, incl. natural or artificial mineral waters and aerated waters, not containing 40  1  - 
2202  waters, incl. mineral waters and aerated waters, containing added sugar or other  40  2  - 
2204 wine  of  fresh  grapes, incl. fortified wines; grape must, partly fermented and of an  40  3  - 
2205  vermouth and other wine of fresh grapes, flavoured with plants or aromatic substances  40  2  - 
2207 undenatured  ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of >= 80%; ethyl alcohol  40  1  - 
2208 undenatured  ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of < 80%; spirits, liqueurs 40  5  2 
2402  cigars, cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes of tobacco or of tobacco substitutes  30  1  - 
2403  manufactured tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes and 'homogenised' or  30  1  - 
3301  essential oils, whether or not terpeneless, incl. concretes and absolutes; resinoids;  30  1  4 
Note: 
(a) The  maximum  ad valorem tariff applicable to any HS6 subhead included within the HS4 aggregate. 
 
The absence of basic foods does not arise because Ethiopia imports little from the EU. In 
2003 its imports of wheat (HS 100190) totalled €48 million. But its tariff was only 5 percent. 
Reciprocity would not significantly lower the price of imports from the EU (nor of itself 
result in trade diversion from non-EPA sources). This may be an entirely rational strategy, 
and one that Ethiopia does not wish to change in future. But before it decides to include 
wheat in its offer (because the current tariff is so low) it needs to consider whether or not it 
wishes forever to remove tariffs on imports from the EU. Otherwise a future government 
wishing to raise the tariff will find that its hands are tied. As Ethiopia is not a member of the 
WTO it does not need to take account of its bound rates, but the other focus countries do need 
to do so. A first step for them is to check whether or not the items with low applied rates also 
have low bound ones. In these cases the scope to raise tariffs in future, that inclusion in an 
EPA would prejudice, does not exist. But in other cases it does. 
 
In the case of Ethiopia, therefore, the result of the EPA scenario analysis is to suggest a 
review of current agricultural trade policy. Whilst the EPA does not seem to be incompatible 
with current agricultural trade policy, it will remove the room for manoeuvre on future policy 
change that the government currently enjoys. It would be desirable to use the requirement to 
establish a ‘defensive’ EPA position to consider strategically the country’s agricultural trade 
interests and how they can best be fostered by market access policy.  
 
Very similar pictures emerge for Lesotho (which has the complication of SACU membership) 
as well as for Mozambique and Zambia (which do not). Apart from pork, dairy products and 
vegetables, Mozambique’s exclusions are concentrated on processed foods and revenue items 
(Table 6); imports of wheat from the EU in 2003 totalled €11 million, over a tariff of just 2.5 
percent. For Zambia too, one meat item (beef), dairy, a few vegetables plus processed foods 
and revenue items predominate (Table 7); wheat faces only a 5 percent tariff (although 
imports from the EU in 2003 were a modest €570,000). 
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Table 5. Lesotho: composition of an exclusion basket based on Scenario 1 and applied tariff levels 
No. of HS6 
subheads 
HS4  Description  Max.  
tariff
 a 
Excluded  Not 
excluded 
0713  dried leguminous vegetables, shelled, whether or not skinned or split  30  1  - 
1515  fixed vegetable fats and oils, incl. jojoba oil, and their fractions, whether or not refined,  10 1  - 
1901  malt extract; food preparations of flour, groats, meal, starch or malt extract, not  20 1  - 
2203  beer made from malt  5  1  - 
2204  wine of fresh grapes, incl. fortified wines; grape must, partly fermented and of an  25 1  - 
3301  essential oils, whether or not terpeneless, incl. concretes and absolutes; resinoids;  20 1  - 
Note: 
(a) The  maximum  ad valorem tariff applicable to any HS6 subhead included within the HS4 aggregate. 
 
Table 6. Mozambique: composition of an exclusion basket based on Scenario 1 and applied tariff levels 
No. of HS6 
subheads 
HS4  Description  Max.  
tariff
 a 
Excluded  Not 
excluded 
0203  meat of swine, fresh, chilled or frozen  25  1  - 
0405  butter, incl. dehydrated butter and ghee, and other fats and oils derived from milk;  25 1  - 
0406  cheese and curd  25 2  1 
0703  onions, shallots, garlic, leeks and other alliaceous vegetables, fresh or chilled  25  1  - 
0713  dried leguminous vegetables, shelled, whether or not skinned or split  25  1  5 
0901  coffee, whether or not roasted or decaffeinated; coffee husks and skins; coffee  25 1  2 
1507  soya-bean oil and its fractions, whether or not refined (excl. chemically modified)  25  1  - 
1509  olive oil and its fractions obtained from the fruit of the olive tree solely by mechanical  25 2  - 
1514  rape, colza or mustard oil and fractions thereof, whether or not refined, but not  25 1  - 
1517  margarine, other edible mixtures or preparations of animal or vegetable fats or oils and  25 1  1 
1601  sausages and similar products, of meat, offal or blood; food preparations based on  25 1  - 
1602  prepared or preserved meat, offal or blood (excl. sausages and similar products, and  25 1  6 
1902  pasta, whether or not cooked or stuffed with meat or other substances or otherwise  25 1  3 
1905  bread, pastry, cakes, biscuits and other bakers' wares, whether or not containing  25 2  2 
2001  vegetables, fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved by  25 1  1 
2002  tomatoes, prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid  25  1  1 
2003  mushrooms and truffles, prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic  25 1  - 
2005  other vegetables prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid, not  25 2  7 
2103  sauce and preparations therefor; mixed condiments and mixed seasonings; mustard  25 1  3 
2104  soups and broths and preparations therefor; food preparations consisting of finely  25 1  1 
2106  food preparations, n.e.s.  25  1  1 
2201  waters, incl. natural or artificial mineral waters and aerated waters, not containing  25 1  1 
2202  waters, incl. mineral waters and aerated waters, containing added sugar or other  25 2  - 
2203  beer made from malt  25  1  - 
2204  wine of fresh grapes, incl. fortified wines; grape must, partly fermented and of an  25 2  1 
2208  undenatured ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of < 80%; spirits, liqueurs  25 2  5 
2309  preparations of a kind used in animal feeding  25  1  1 
2402  cigars, cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes of tobacco or of tobacco substitutes  25  1  1 
Note: 
(a) The  maximum  ad valorem tariff applicable to any HS6 subhead included within the HS4 aggregate. 
 
Table 7. Zambia: composition of an exclusion basket based on Scenario 1 and applied tariff levels 
No. of HS6 
subheads 
HS4  Description  Max.  
tariff
 a 
Excluded  Not 
excluded 
0202  meat of bovine animals, frozen  25  1  - 
0402  milk and cream, concentrated or containing added sugar or other sweetening matter  25  1  - 
0405  butter, incl. dehydrated butter and ghee, and other fats and oils derived from milk;  25  2  - 
0406  cheese and curd  25 1  - 
0603  cut flowers and flower buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or for ornamental purposes, 25  1  -  13
No. of HS6 
subheads 
HS4  Description  Max.  
tariff
 a 
Excluded  Not 
excluded 
0703  onions, shallots, garlic, leeks and other alliaceous vegetables, fresh or chilled  25  1  - 
0708 leguminous  vegetables,  shelled or unshelled, fresh or chilled  25  1  - 
0713  dried leguminous vegetables, shelled, whether or not skinned or split  25  1  - 
0901  coffee, whether or not roasted or decaffeinated; coffee husks and skins; coffee  25  1  - 
1509  olive oil and its fractions obtained from the fruit of the olive tree solely by mechanical or  25  2  - 
1510  other oils and their fractions, obtained solely from olives, whether or not refined, but  25  1  - 
1516  animal or vegetable fats and oils and their fractions, partly or wholly hydrogenated, 25  1 - 
1601 sausages and similar products, of meat, offal or blood; food preparations based on  25  1  - 
1602  prepared or preserved meat, offal or blood (excl. sausages and similar products, and  25  1  - 
1704  sugar confectionery not containing cocoa, incl. white chocolate  25  1  - 
1806  chocolate and other food preparations containing cocoa  25  1  - 
1902  pasta, whether or not cooked or stuffed with meat or other substances or otherwise  25  1  - 
1905 bread,  pastry, cakes, biscuits and other bakers' wares, whether or not containing 25  1  - 
2002  tomatoes, prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid  25  2  - 
2101  extracts, essences and concentrates, of coffee, tea or mate and preparations  with  a 25 1  - 
2103 sauce  and  preparations therefor; mixed condiments and mixed seasonings; mustard  25  1  - 
2106  food preparations, n.e.s.  25  2  - 
2202  waters, incl. mineral waters and aerated waters, containing added sugar or other  25  1  - 
2204 wine  of  fresh  grapes, incl. fortified wines; grape must, partly fermented and of an  25  3  - 
2207 undenatured  ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of >= 80%; ethyl alcohol  25  1  1 
2208 undenatured  ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of < 80%; spirits, liqueurs 25  5  - 
2309  preparations of a kind used in animal feeding  25  1  - 
2402  cigars, cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes of tobacco or of tobacco substitutes  25  1  - 
3504  peptones and their derivatives; other albuminous substances and their derivatives,  25  1  - 
Note: 
(a) The  maximum  ad valorem tariff applicable to any HS6 subhead included within the HS4 aggregate. 
 
Tanzania (Table 8) and Uganda (Table 9) have much broader baskets of agricultural 
exemptions. This is mainly because two-thirds of agricultural items face a 25 percent tariff in 
Tanzania and a 15 percent tariff in Uganda. The key agricultural issues for these countries 
would arise if they had to exclude some of the items listed in Tables 8 and 9 either to protect 
revenue or to make way for non-agricultural products.  
 
When the greater part of the agricultural sections of the HS have identical tariffs, the 
schedules do not by themselves provide much guidance on the relative priorities within the 
rural economy. For these countries, as well as for Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zambia, 
therefore, the EPA scenario analysis has pointed to the importance of ensuring that 
agricultural priorities are well defined. 
 
Table 8. Tanzania: composition of an exclusion basket based on Scenario 1 and applied tariff levels 
No. of HS6 
subheads 
HS4  Description  Max.  
tariff
 a 
Excluded  Not 
excluded 
0104  live sheep and goats  25  1  - 
0105 live  poultry, 'fowls of the species gallus domesticus, ducks, geese, turkeys and guinea 25  1  - 
0202  meat of bovine animals, frozen  25  2  - 
0203  meat of swine, fresh, chilled or frozen  25  1  - 
0204  meat of sheep or goats, fresh, chilled or frozen  25  1  - 
0206  edible offal of bovine animals, swine, sheep, goats, horses, asses, mules or hinnies,  25  1  - 
0207  meat and edible offal of fowls of the species gallus domesticus, ducks, geese, turkeys 25  1  - 
0210  meat and edible offal, salted, in brine, dried or smoked; edible flours and meals of  25  2  - 
0401  milk and cream, not concentrated nor containing added sugar or other sweetening 25  3  -  14
No. of HS6 
subheads 
HS4  Description  Max.  
tariff
 a 
Excluded  Not 
excluded 
0402  milk and cream, concentrated or containing added sugar or other sweetening matter  25  2  - 
0403  buttermilk, curdled milk and cream, yogurt, k+phir and other fermented or acidified milk  25  2  - 
0404 whey, whether or not concentrated or containing added sugar or other sweetening 25  1  - 
0405  butter, incl. dehydrated butter and ghee, and other fats and oils derived from milk;  25  1  - 
0406  cheese and curd  25 5  - 
0603  cut flowers and flower buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or for ornamental purposes, 25  1  - 
0710  vegetables, uncooked or cooked by steaming or boiling in water, frozen  25  5  - 
0712  dried vegetables, whole, cut, sliced, broken or in powder, but not further prepared  25  2  - 
0713  dried leguminous vegetables, shelled, whether or not skinned or split  25  3  - 
0802  other nuts, fresh or dried, whether or not shelled or peeled (excl. coconuts, brazil nuts  25  4  - 
0813 dried  apricots, prunes, apples, peaches, pears, papaws 'papayas', tamarinds and other  25  1  - 
0901  coffee, whether or not roasted or decaffeinated; coffee husks and skins; coffee  25  1  - 
0902 Tea  25 2  - 
0904  pepper of the genus piper; dried or crushed or ground fruits of the genus capsicum or  25  2  - 
0910  ginger, saffron, turmeric 'curcuma', thyme, bay leaves, curry and other spices (excl. 25 4  - 
1008 buckwheat,  millet,  canary seed and other cereals (excl. wheat and meslin, rye, barley, 25  1  - 
1101  wheat or meslin flour  25  1  - 
1103  cereal groats, meal and pellets  25  1  - 
1104 cereal  grains otherwise worked, e.g. hulled, rolled, flaked, pearled, sliced or kebbled;  25  2  - 
1108 Starches;  inulin  25 1  - 
1109  wheat gluten, whether or not dried  25  1  - 
1207  other oil seeds and oleaginous fruits, whether or not broken (excl. edible nuts, olives,  25  1  - 
1212  locust beans, seaweeds and other algae, sugar beet and sugar cane, fresh, chilled,  25  1  - 
1508  groundnut oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified  25  1  - 
1509  olive oil and its fractions obtained from the fruit of the olive tree solely by mechanical  25  1  1 
1510  other oils and their fractions, obtained solely from olives, whether or not refined, but  25  1  - 
1511  palm oil and its fractions, whether or not refined (excl. chemically modified)  25  1  - 
1512 sunflower-seed, safflower or cotton-seed oil and fractions thereof, whether or not  25  1  - 
1515 fixed  vegetable fats and oils, incl. jojoba oil, and their fractions, whether or not refined,  25  4  1 
1516  animal or vegetable fats and oils and their fractions, partly or wholly hydrogenated, 25  1 - 
1517 margarine, other edible mixtures or preparations of animal or vegetable fats or oils and  25  2  - 
1518  animal or vegetable fats and oils and their fractions, boiled, oxidised, dehydrated, 25  1  - 
1601 sausages and similar products, of meat, offal or blood; food preparations based on  25  1  - 
1602  prepared or preserved meat, offal or blood (excl. sausages and similar products, and  25  4  - 
1701  cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose, in solid form  25  2  - 
1702 other  sugars, incl. chemically pure lactose, maltose, glucose and fructose, in solid  25  2  - 
1704  sugar confectionery not containing cocoa, incl. white chocolate  25  2  - 
1806  chocolate and other food preparations containing cocoa  25  5  - 
1901  malt extract; food preparations of flour, groats, meal, starch or malt extract, not  25  2  1 
1902  pasta, whether or not cooked or stuffed with meat or other substances or otherwise  25  4  - 
1903 tapioca and substitutes therefor prepared from starch, in the form of flakes, grains, 25  1 - 
1904  prepared foods obtained by the swelling or roasting of cereals or cereal products, e.g. 25  2  - 
1905 bread,  pastry, cakes, biscuits and other bakers' wares, whether or not containing 25  3  - 
2001 vegetables, fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved by 25  2  - 
2208 undenatured  ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of < 80%; spirits, liqueurs 25  7  - 
2005 other  vegetables prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid, not  25  6  - 
2008  fruits, nuts and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved, whether or not  25  6  - 
2009 fruit  juices, incl. grape must, and vegetable juices, unfermented, not containing added  25  4  - 
2103 sauce  and  preparations therefor; mixed condiments and mixed seasonings; mustard  25  3  - 
2204 wine  of  fresh  grapes, incl. fortified wines; grape must, partly fermented and of an  25  3  - 
2002  tomatoes, prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid  25  2  - 
2102  yeasts, active or inactive; other dead single-cell micro-organisms, prepared baking 25  2 - 
2104 soups and broths and preparations therefor; food preparations consisting of finely 25  2  - 
2202  waters, incl. mineral waters and aerated waters, containing added sugar or other  25  2  -  15
No. of HS6 
subheads 
HS4  Description  Max.  
tariff
 a 
Excluded  Not 
excluded 
2402  cigars, cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes of tobacco or of tobacco substitutes  25  2  - 
2004 vegetables prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid, frozen  25  1  - 
2007  jams, fruit jellies, marmalades, fruit or nut puree and fruit or nut pastes, obtained by 25 1  - 
2105  ice cream and other edible ice, whether or not containing cocoa  25  1  - 
2106  food preparations, n.e.s.  25  1  1 
2203  beer made from malt  25  1  - 
2205  vermouth and other wine of fresh grapes, flavoured with plants or aromatic substances  25  1  - 
2206 cider,  perry, mead and other fermented beverages (excl. beer, wine of fresh grapes, 25 1  - 
2209  vinegar, fermented vinegar and substitutes for vinegar obtained from acetic acid  25  1  - 
2403  Manufactured tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes and 'homogenised' or  25  1  - 
Note: 
(a) The  maximum  ad valorem tariff applicable to any HS6 subhead included within the HS4 aggregate. 
 
Table 9. Uganda: composition of an exclusion basket based on Scenario 1 and applied tariff levels 
No. of HS6 
subheads 
HS4  Description  Max.  
tariff
 a 
Excluded  Not 
excluded 
0210  meat and edible offal, salted, in brine, dried or smoked; edible flours and meals of  15  1  - 
0401  milk and cream, not concentrated nor containing added sugar or other sweetening 15  1  - 
0402  milk and cream, concentrated or containing added sugar or other sweetening matter  15  3  - 
0403  buttermilk, curdled milk and cream, yogurt, k+phir and other fermented or acidified milk  15  2  - 
0405  butter, incl. dehydrated butter and ghee, and other fats and oils derived from milk;  15  1  - 
0406  cheese and curd  15 4  - 
0407  birds' eggs, in shell, fresh, preserved or cooked  15  1  - 
0409 natural  honey  15 1  - 
0712  dried vegetables, whole, cut, sliced, broken or in powder, but not further prepared  15  2  - 
0713  dried leguminous vegetables, shelled, whether or not skinned or split  15  2  - 
0802  other nuts, fresh or dried, whether or not shelled or peeled (excl. coconuts, brazil nuts  15  1  - 
0808  apples, pears and quinces, fresh  15  2  - 
1101  wheat or meslin flour  15  1  - 
1103  cereal groats, meal and pellets  15  1  - 
1104 cereal  grains otherwise worked, e.g. hulled, rolled, flaked, pearled, sliced or kebbled;  15  1  - 
1508  groundnut oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified  15  1  - 
1509  olive oil and its fractions obtained from the fruit of the olive tree solely by mechanical or  15  1  1 
1510  other oils and their fractions, obtained solely from olives, whether or not refined, but  15  1  - 
1512 sunflower-seed, safflower or cotton-seed oil and fractions thereof, whether or not  15  1  - 
1514 rape, colza or mustard oil and fractions thereof, whether or not refined, but not  15  1  - 
1601 sausages and similar products, of meat, offal or blood; food preparations based on  15  1  - 
1602  prepared or preserved meat, offal or blood (excl. sausages and similar products, and  15  1  - 
1701  cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose, in solid form  15  1  - 
1704  sugar confectionery not containing cocoa, incl. white chocolate  15  2  - 
1806  chocolate and other food preparations containing cocoa  15  4  - 
1901  malt extract; food preparations of flour, groats, meal, starch or malt extract, not  15  3  - 
1902  pasta, whether or not cooked or stuffed with meat or other substances or otherwise  15  3  - 
1903 tapioca and substitutes therefor prepared from starch, in the form of flakes, grains, 15  1 - 
1904  prepared foods obtained by the swelling or roasting of cereals or cereal products, e.g. 15  2  - 
1905 bread,  pastry, cakes, biscuits and other bakers' wares, whether or not containing 15  3  - 
2001 vegetables, fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved by 15  2  - 
2002  tomatoes, prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid  15  2  - 
2005 other  vegetables prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid, not  15  3  - 
2007  jams, fruit jellies, marmalades, fruit or nut puree and fruit or nut pastes, obtained by 15 2  - 
2008  fruits, nuts and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved, whether or not  15  1  - 
2009 fruit  juices, incl. grape must, and vegetable juices, unfermented, not containing added  15  2  - 
2103 sauce  and  preparations therefor; mixed condiments and mixed seasonings; mustard  15  4  -  16
No. of HS6 
subheads 
HS4  Description  Max.  
tariff
 a 
Excluded  Not 
excluded 
2104 soups and broths and preparations therefor; food preparations consisting of finely 15  2  - 
2105  ice cream and other edible ice, whether or not containing cocoa  15  1  - 
2106  food preparations, n.e.s.  7  1  1 
2201  waters, incl. natural or artificial mineral waters and aerated waters, not containing 15  1  - 
2202  waters, incl. mineral waters and aerated waters, containing added sugar or other  15  2  - 
2203  beer made from malt  15  1  - 
2204 wine  of  fresh  grapes, incl. fortified wines; grape must, partly fermented and of an  15  3  - 
2205  vermouth and other wine of fresh grapes, flavoured with plants or aromatic substances  15  1  - 
2207 undenatured  ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of >= 80%; ethyl alcohol  15  1  - 
2208 undenatured  ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of < 80%; spirits, liqueurs 15  7  - 
2209  vinegar, fermented vinegar and substitutes for vinegar obtained from acetic acid  15  1  - 
2402  cigars, cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes of tobacco or of tobacco substitutes  15  1  - 
3301  essential oils, whether or not terpeneless, incl. concretes and absolutes; resinoids;  15  2  - 
Note: 




When assessing the potential effects of reciprocity on agriculture the six focus countries fall 
into two groups. There appear unlikely to be major changes to the status quo in Ethiopia, 
Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia because these countries tend currently to levy low tariffs 
on the basic agricultural products that they import from the EU. If tariffs are currently low, 
their removal entirely over a transition period of 12–15 years is unlikely to have significant 
price effects. It is agro-industry rather than crop and livestock production that receives import 
protection at present and which will experience a significant price change as a result of EPAs. 
In Tanzania and Uganda, by contrast, there is more extensive protection of agriculture at 
present. For this reason, EPAs could have effects that might be significant although not huge 
(as the tariffs involved are only moderately high). On the other hand, it appears to be 
relatively easy for most of these price effects to be deferred until the end of the transition 
period or to be removed altogether by excluding the items from the basket of products to be 
liberalised. This strategy, though, could cause revenue problems for the governments since it 
will require them to concentrate the tariff cuts on items that currently generate relatively high 
taxes. 
 
In the case of both groups, though, there is a strong case to be made that the preparation of a 
‘defensive’ EPA strategy should occur in parallel with a strategic review of agricultural trade 
policy. What role should trade play in these countries’ agricultural strategies both in 
aggregate and, especially, in relation to specific products? What is the appropriate 
government trade policy to facilitate this role? 
 
The research results described in this paper explain why such a review is feasible. Contrary to 
much popular comment, EPAs need not (and very probably will not) result in 100 percent 
liberalisation by an ACP state. If the popular view were correct no useful purpose would be 
served by the recommended strategic review: if all import barriers have to be removed, there 
is no point considering which should remain! But in practice quite a few will remain for 10–
15 years, and other even after that. Which ones?  
 
The paper also indicates one reason why such a review is timely. EPAs are likely to be 
followed by other trade negotiations (e.g. with the USA). What sorts of government support 
does African agriculture require? Are the first group of countries right to protect their agro- 17
industries and not their basic agriculture? If not, perhaps some tariffs should be raised (or at 
least freedom to do so retained) whilst others are slashed. Answers to such questions are 
needed before, not after, binding agreements have been signed. 
 
There is another consideration to be taken into account in this review that falls outside the 
scope of the paper but could be included in the EPA negotiations. This concerns what to do 
about EU exports that are subsidised (directly or indirectly) or contain inputs that are 
subsidised (as is the case, for example, with some processed food). The quantitative 
interpretation of Article XXIV appears to leave no scope for the additional exclusion of such 
goods. But the EU’s other agreements, most notably the TDCA, provide for the flexible use 
of agricultural safeguards. In some cases it might be appropriate for tariffs on agricultural 
goods to be removed but for a countervailing levy to be imposed to offset EU subsidies until 
such time as these disappear. By contrast to the reciprocity issues analysed in this paper there 
are no precise precedents on which to build scenarios. But it is a matter that should be 
included in the negotiations – and one that should not be overlooked by in-country analysis. 
 
Finally, the in-country analysis needs to consider the development assistance required to 
support agricultural strategies within the context of EPAs. There will be a need for 
adjustment assistance both to deal with the consequences of reciprocity and to take advantage 
of any improved access to the EU market. One intriguing possibility is that the ACP 
liberalisation timetable for some products could be set in relation to the effective delivery of 
such support. To be effective, sectoral needs would have to be specified with sufficient 
precision that the extent of delivery could be measured.  18
References 
 
Maerten, C.  2004. ‘Economic Partnership Agreements: A New Approach to ACP–EU 
Economic and Trade Co-operation’, presentation to TRALAC Annual International Trade 
Law Conference, November. 
WTO 1995. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal 
Texts. Geneva: The World Trade Organization (also available on-line at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm). 
WTO 2004. ‘Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 
2004’, WT/L/579. Geneva: World Trade Organization. 
 Institute for International Integration Studies
The Sutherland Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland